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Abstract 
Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment 
systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees 
(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial 
lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it 
will however lead to higher cardholders’ fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale 
terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent 
that increased cardholders’ fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new 
cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an 
imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from 
the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are 
excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed 
from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by 
issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized 
merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes 
pricing them in variable terms. 
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1  Introduction and summary 
According to recent decisions of the Spanish national competition authority, the Tribunal 
de Defensa de la Competencia (TDC), on Cases 4B, Servired and Euro 6000, which deal with 
the interchange fees determined by the Spanish payment networks for domestic card 
transactions made within each of the systems,1 four-party payment systems can only include 
two costs when setting domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIFs): a fixed cost for 
processing each transaction, whatever its value; and a variable ad valorem cost for the risk of 
fraud.  
The TDC therefore rejects the possibility of including the cost of the payment guarantee 
beyond fraud protection, the interest for the free funding period, as well as the possibility that 
processing costs may vary according to the transaction value. The TDC in fact sets the ceiling 
for MIFs not at cost but well below the cost of the services in question.2 Furthermore, the 
TDC introduces additional constraints in MIFs, precluding for example differential prices for 
different sectors.  
This paper will examine what consequences can be expected from this regulation in the 
context of the Spanish market.3  
The TDC supports its decision in arguments used by the European Commission in its 
2002 Visa International decision,4 in which the Commission decided that the setting of MIFs 
by Visa in cross-border payments restricted competition under Article 81(1) EC but, 
considering that the MIFs, as amended by Visa, satisfied the four conditions listed in Article 
81(3) EC, the Commission granted Visa an individual exemption subject to several 
requirements, including disclosure of MIFs to affiliated merchants and setting MIFs at a level 
objectively justified by costs. The Commission also considered that for this setting of MIFs 
three cost categories could legitimately be included: the cost of processing transactions, the 
cost of providing the “payment guarantee” and the cost of the “free-funding” period. 
                                                 
1 TDC Decisions of April 11, 2005, No. A 314/02, Tasas Intercambio SISTEMA 4B; A 318/02, Tasas 
Intercambio SERVIRED; and No. A 287/00 Sistema Euro 6000. 
2 Using as reference the cost estimations of Visa and MasterCard in their cross-border card transactions within 
the European region, it can be concluded that the TDC excludes much of the total costs: The cost of the 
payment guarantee is estimated at 50% of total costs by both Visa and MasterCard, and the TDC would allow to 
include only those related to fraud. The cost of free funding period, which is fully excluded by the TDC, 
amounts to 26% of total costs in Visa and 25% in MasterCard. Finally, the processing cost, whose inclusion is 
allowed by the TDC as a flat fee, is estimated at 24% of total costs by Visa and 25% by MasterCard in their 
cross-border POS transactions within the European region (percentages and more detail available at 
http://www.visaeu.com/acceptingvisa/interchange. html and 
http://www.mastercardInternationalcom/corporate/mif_information.html, accessed September 15, 2005). 
3 In relation to interchange fees see, among others, David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with 
Plastic, 2
nd  ed., Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2005; and the papers presented at two recent conferences, on 
“Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What Role for Public Authorities?” (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Santa Fe, New Mexico, May 4-6, 2005, http://www.kc.frb.org, accessed September 15, 
2005), and “Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences” (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, New York, September 15-16, 2005, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2005/antitrust_activity.html, accessed September 15, 2005). 
4 See Commission Decision as COMP.29.373, VISA International, OJ L 318, 22.11.2002, pp. 17-36.    3
However, the paper will show that the TDC interprets this Visa International decision too 
narrowly and therefore excludes certain costs which were accepted by the European 
Commission as providing value to merchants and appropriately covered by MIF. 
After this Introduction, the second section argues that artificially lowering interchange 
fees will not necessarily lead to lower consumer prices because retailing in Spain is 
uncompetitive. As a consequence, the new rules will primarily favor large retailers, who are 
in fact competitors of conventional payment systems. Lower MIFs will, however, lead to 
higher cardholders’ fees and possibly higher prices for point of sale (POS) terminals, as 
banks seek to recover lost interchange revenue, which will delay the development of the 
immature Spanish card market. In addition, to the extent that additional revenue from 
cardholders’ fees does not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, card issuing activities will be 
underpaid. This underpayment will significantly damage smaller issuers, who are 
disadvantaged by comparison with the larger issuers, who are best able to withstand losing 
revenue from one side of their business, as they are more likely to have the scale and 
diversity of revenue streams which are not available to the smaller issuers. As a consequence, 
the largest issuers will become more powerful. This may trigger undesirable transformations 
in the networks, such as break ups of the networks themselves, in order to rebalance the 
issuing and acquiring sides of the market.  
The pricing scheme arising from the TDC decisions will likely cause significant 
unbundling and underprovision of those services the costs of which those decisions prohibit 
from being included in MIFs, in contravention to the reasoning contained in the Visa 
International decision. Indeed, services associated with the payment guarantee and the free 
funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided by 
the card issuers as part of the network offering, to be either provided by third parties, by 
issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized 
merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences of the exclusion by the 
TDC of the possibility of pricing them in variable terms.  
The third section focuses on the consequences of allowing issuers to receive 
compensation via the MIF only for the fraud component of the payment guarantee and not for 
other components. Issuers would not be able to charge for the credit risk guarantee and would 
probably stop guaranteeing payments. As a result, merchants would lose sales because there 
are not effective substitutes for such guarantee and merchants would therefore sell less to 
unknown cardholders.  
Moreover, the payment guarantee is particularly costly and useful in Spain, due to the 
inefficiency and cost of recovering unpaid debts through Spanish courts and the significant 
demand existing for consumer credit. Furthermore, there are no viable substitutes in the 
market for the payment guarantee provided by banks and none are likely to develop, even if 
one were to assume that third party providers were able to gain access to lenders’ databases 
by purchasing that information. Thus, the very same two arguments which led the 
Commission to accept that the cost of the payment guarantee should be included in the 
calculation of an interchange for cross-border transactions—that is, merchants’ benefits and 
lack of substitutes—are present in Spanish domestic transactions. However, the TDC 
decisions have excluded them.  
These two conditions contained in the Visa International decision are equally present with 
respect to the free funding period, which has been also excluded from the categories of costs 
accepted by the TDC. As the fourth section of this paper notes, free funding and other cash 
management services provided by credit card systems are especially valuable for Spanish 
consumers and firms, because they are not particularly methodic about cash management, as   4
shown by national surveys and cross-country data, which demonstrate poor personal financial 
management as well as the prevalence of longer payment periods and payment delays in 
Spain than in other European countries. Moreover, cardholders paying with cards encounter 
similar difficulties in checking their bank accounts to ensure that they have sufficient funds 
not only in cross-border transactions, but also when conducting domestic transactions. For 
these reasons, it seems clear that domestic free funding benefits merchants.  
Finally, section five criticizes how the TDC treats processing costs. When excluding 
some processing costs which in its view do not “fundamentally” benefit merchants, the TDC 
focuses on tangible benefits, thereby overlooking positive externalities produced by the use 
of cards. Similarly, the TDC ignores that some processing costs effectively vary depending 
on the amount and the industry sector in which the card transaction is carried out. Instead, it 
imposes uniform processing costs for all economic sectors. This approach will lead to 
inefficient and ineffective allocation of processing costs among transactions and industries 
which generate widely different costs.  
2  Consequences of artificially lowering MIFs in Spain 
2.1  Lower rates will not necessarily lead to lower consumer prices in view 
of the uncompetitive retailing 
Regulation of MIFs is often based on two assumptions: first, it assumes that, if issuing 
banks charge lower MIFs to acquiring banks, the latter will also charge lower discount fees to 
merchants; and second, it assumes that merchants will pass through the lower discount fees to 
consumers as lower final prices.  
This second assumption is unfounded, because, as the Visa International decision 
correctly points out, this two-step sequence fails when retailers are not in a competitive 
market.5 Unfortunately, competition is very limited in Spanish retailing, as it has been 
repeatedly criticized by the IMF, the OECD and the TDC itself.6 Artificially lowered MIFs 
will therefore not lead to lower consumers’ prices but they will only increase merchants’ 
margins. This was expressly assumed in a recent parliamentary motion that flatly asserted 
that its goal was to “improve the margins of retailers and service providers.”7  
                                                 
5 The decision conditions potential reductions in prices to strong competition in retailing: “In cases where there 
is strong price competition between merchants, the fall in merchants’ costs [due to possibly lower discount fees] 
could lead to reduced prices for all consumers, including those who pay by Visa card” (para. 94).  
6 International Monetary Fund, Report on Spain, Washington, January 2005; Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Economic Survey of Spain, Paris, 2005; and TDC, Informe sobre las condiciones 
de competencia en el sector de la distribución comercial, Madrid, 2003. The Spanish retailing market has 
become increasingly uncompetitive since 1985, due to the increased barriers to entry (redundant licensing) and 
the restrictive regulation of opening hours and sales existing in Spain, together with a preferential taxation. 
7 Grupo Parlamentario Catalán [Convergència i Unió], “relativa al cumplimiento de las resoluciones del 
Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia en materia de fijación de tasas de intercambio aplicadas sobre los pagos 
efectuados mediante tarjetas de crédito o débito,” April 28, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes, 161/000900, Serie D, 
no. 199, May 10, 2005, p. 16.   5
2.2  Large retailers are likely to benefit the most 
Both large and small retailers will benefit from lower MIFs, because many of them enjoy 
local monopoly power.8 However, large retailers are likely to benefit the most, to the extent 
that their business model is based on acting as financial intermediaries and increasing 
customers’ switching costs. Large retailers are not passive distribution “channels”, but 
vertically integrated structures, and their huge market power allows them to put pressure on 
suppliers and challenge the most profitable portions of their businesses.9 Card payment 
systems are just one of these suppliers, and as such, they are pressured and subject to 
competition from progressively more integrated large retailers:  
Large retailers have developed their own payment systems, which come in two forms:  
Firstly, by means of store cards, which in Spain enjoy a market share that almost doubles 
the EU average (10.03% of total value of card transactions by comparison to 5.73% in the 
EU)10 (see Table 1) and provide services similar to credit cards, with implicit negative fees 
created by free funding, perks (free parking, insurance), free financing and loyalty schemes, 
in addition to charging no annual fees.11  
Secondly, large retailers are also main issuers of credit cards, which are then mostly used 
in their stores. For instance, Carrefour—the second largest retailer in the world—is currently 
one of the most aggressive issuers of Visa in Spain and, contrary to most Spanish issuers, it 
continues to offer a free Visa card to its customers.12 As retailers simultaneously act as 
merchants, acquirers and issuers, they become a sort of two-party payment systems, given 
that they have the cardholder as their only counterparty. Thus, they are increasingly effective 
competitors of the other payment systems.  
Furthermore, large retailers develop this strategy from their very strong position as 
financial intermediaries, given that they control the vast funding gap provided by the 
difference between their long periods of payment to suppliers and their almost instantaneous 
collection of funds from clients.  
Considering this integrating strategy of large retailers, who were the most active 
complainants during the TDC investigation leading to the three contested decisions, it is 
likely that they will benefit from the damage caused by the TDC decisions to conventional 
banks.  
The situation is even worse from the perspective of consumers’ protection, because large 
retailers are increasingly developing loyalty schemes that reduce competition in retailing, 
while the loyalty schemes of credit cards are neutral across retailers. Loyalty schemes offered 
by retailers differ from those offered by credit cards, because they increase the cost of 
switching between retailers, thereby building up their market power. The opposite happens 
                                                 
8 Local monopoly power has been stressed as a main feature of Spanish distribution by the former President of 
the TDC. See: Amadeo Petitbò, “Gallofas comerciales,” La Vanguardia, August 15, 2005.  
9 See Benito Arruñada, “The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers: An Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation 
with Suppliers,” Revue d’Economie Industrielle, no. 92, 2
nd and 3
rd trimesters, 2000, pp. 277-296. 
10 According to the data included in Commission Decision as COMP.29.373, VISA International, OJ L 293, 
11.10.2001, pp. 39-41. 
11 Bank of Spain, “Capítulo del Bluebook sobre España,” Madrid, 2001, p. 12 
(http://www.bde.es/sispago/blueboo.pdf, accessed September 15, 2005).  
12 See https://www.pass.carrefour.es (accessed September 15, 2005).    6
with many credit card loyalty schemes because consumers obtain the bonus associated to the 
use of the card, regardless of the store in which they purchase.  
2.3  Lower MIFs would lead to higher card issuance and maintenance fees 
and possibly higher prices for POS terminals 
The MIF below cost that results from the TDC decisions would produce similar damage 
to the absence of a MIF, whose consequences have been pointed out by the Visa International 
decision (para. 102): either issuers absorb costs and recover them by charging higher fees for 
unrelated services or issuers charge increased annual fees or transaction-related fees to 
cardholders, or both. The latter possibility might destabilize the system and set a downward 
spiral in its use as consumers would pay fees which include the cost of services provided to 
merchants.  
In the Spanish case, higher cardholders’ fees are the most likely result of the TDC 
decisions, because these decisions apply to domestic transactions, which represent the vast 
majority of transactions in Spain instead of applying only to international transactions, as in 
the Visa International case decided by the Commission. For instance, while the Visa 
International decision affected 10% of total transaction volume, the TDC decisions affect 
96% of all Visa transactions.13 Therefore, cross-subsidization between both types of 
transaction, domestic and international, or even from other services, is hardly possible.  
Increases in the annual fees charged to cardholders should also be expected, in view of 
the experience in recent years, which saw some growth in annual in fees as a response to 
increase pressure to reduce MIFs.14 Moreover, charges to cardholders for each transaction, or 
depending on the transaction value, are also possible.  
Another likely effect would also be the reduction or disappearance of benefits currently 
provided as part of the interchange fee (that is, among others, free funding and insurance) and 
through loyalty bonuses and reward schemes.  
As a result thereof, card usage will be reduced. Marginal users will stop using cards 
altogether and others will switch to those cards with lower costs and services. Transaction 
fees will also move users to other forms of payment, some of which are heavily subsidized 
and cause negative externalities (mainly cash, whose production is subsidized by the 
government and whose use causes important negative externalities by favoring crime against 
merchants and even facilitating tax avoidance).15  
The introduction of issuance fees is also likely. Up to now, most cards have been issued 
for free and some banks even pay consumers to sign up for cards, hoping to recover the 150-
250 euros invested in issuing each card later,16 much as phone companies give away cell 
                                                 
13 These are the percentages for Visa in Spain, according to Servired (TDC Decision of April 11, 2005, A 
318/2002, Tasas Intercambio SERVIRED, p. 11.) 
14 The main changes in this regard as well as their origins are summarized at the end of section 2.4.  
15 What might well be the first empirical evaluation of costs and benefits of alternative payment systems 
concludes that “when all key parties to a transaction are considered and benefits are added, cash and checks are 
more costly than many earlier studies suggest” (Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-
Farrar, “The Economics of a Cashless Society: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments,” 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 04-24, September 2004 
(http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=842, accessed September 15, 2005). 
16 Estimate based on the experience of a high quality issuer.    7
phones. With no hope of recovery, issuance fees will appear, new users will not be rewarded 
for overcoming their learning costs, and plastic money will be introduced more slowly into 
new segments of the populations.  
Direct consequences for merchants are less certain. To the extent that the acquiring 
business continues to be profitable, the policy of making POS terminals available to 
merchants for free would be sustained or even increased. However, to the extent that pricing 
and contracting in the whole network would be revised, terminals would likely be priced 
separately (with an installation fee plus a monthly rental with fixed and variable elements). In 
conclusion, it is likely that merchants will end up paying more than in the current situation 
but offering poorer service to customers. 
In sum, pricing at (or, following the TDC rules, below) measurable, tangible, costs 
implies ignoring the positive externalities generated by credit cards. As a consequence, both 
the use of cards and the availability of terminals would be dictated by individual calculation 
of costs and benefits, leading to suboptimal utilization and supply at the social level.  
2.4  Worst consequences in Spain due to the immaturity of the payment 
card market 
These consequences are aggravated by the immaturity of the Spanish market (see Table 
2), which has lead the Spanish central bank to characterize Spain as “one of the EU countries 
worst placed with respect to the number and average value of transactions with payment 
cards”.17 Key elements of this immaturity are the heavy reliance in cash and the low 
utilization of electronic means of payment. The average Spaniard holds 30% more cash than 
the European average and cash holdings per unit of GDP are 82% greater in Spain than in the 
EU (see Table 2). Furthermore, although Spain has a higher number of terminals and cards 
per inhabitant than other EU countries (the only exception being cards with an e-money 
function), their use in Spain lags substantially behind EU averages. Overall, Spanish 
utilization rates of terminals are below half the EU average in terms of transactions and about 
one third in terms of value. The utilization of cards is similarly low.18 The argument that the 
use of cards is above the optimal level is therefore not applicable to Spain.  
In particular, the Spanish payment system is underdeveloped and underutilized due to 
traditional consumer habits. Given these habits and the low utilization rates, prices should be 
set to motivate greater utilization, and this can only be achieved by introducing incentives at 
the cardholder side, with no issuance fees, low annual card fees, free funding period and 
                                                 
17 Bank of Spain, “Evolución en España de las tarjetas como medio de pago (1996-2004),” Estabilidad 
financiera, no. 8, May, 2005, p. 61 (http://www.bde.es/informes/be/estfin/numero8/estfin0802.pdf, accessed 
September 15, 2005). 
18 According to a recent report by the European Central Bank (Payment and Securities Settlement Systems in 
the European Union: Addendum Incorporating 2003 Figures, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, August, 2005, 
http://www.bde.es/sispago/bbestade.pdf, accessed September 15, 2005), the number of transactions with credit 
cards per POS terminal is only 50.65% of the EU average and, given that the average amount per transaction in 
Spain is also smaller, each terminal processes a total value which is only 37.34% of the EU average. Utilization 
rates are even lower for ATM withdrawals and, in particular, for the use of debit cards in POS terminals. 
Spaniards also use their cards less than the average European: utilization is 65.95% for cards with a cash 
function, 24.89% for debit cards and 92.42% for credit cards. Average values per transaction are also lower, 
with amounts which are only 79.51, 72.43 and 73.73% of the EU average for these three types of card. 
Consequently, the corresponding estimated values of the total annual transactions per card for each type of card 
are only 52.43, 18.03 and 68.14% of the EU average. (See details in Table 2. Data for cash holdings as of 2001.)    8
reward and loyalty bonuses.19 The Visa International decision seemingly agrees, when 
acknowledging the “advantages to the system of encouraging consumers to become 
cardholders… [in] geographic markets where the take up of cards has not reached saturation 
point” (para. 71, footnote 37). Even such a strong critic of MIFs as Alan Frankel also seems 
to concur.20  
Furthermore, recent changes in Spain confirm the argument, as political and regulatory 
pressure since 1999 has coincided with a slowdown in the development of the market. On 
May 12, 1999, as the result of a commission promoted and chaired by the Government, the 
three payment networks agreed with the main merchants’ associations to reduce maximum 
MIFs to 2.75% in July 2002.21 The networks have also been subject to Parliamentary non-
legislative proposals and investigations by the national competition authority. Since then, 
MIFs have been reduced substantially, annual fees have increased and growth in the supply 
of terminals and cards has been damaged. Thus, between 1999 and 2003, the number of POS 
terminals accepting payment cards increased only 32.85% in Spain, well below the average 
increase of 49.65% in the EU (see Table 2).22 The issuance of new cards has also slowed 
down, especially in 2003.23  
2.5  To the extent that cardholders’ fees do not offset the reduction in 
MIFs, issuers will be underpaid. This may lead to undesirable 
transformations in the Spanish payment networks 
To the extent that issuers can not offset the fall in MIFs by charging higher fees to 
cardholders, two types of consequences will follow. First, as issuing banks would be unable 
to cover the costs of the services they provide and the compensation between acquirers and 
issuers would be unbalanced, there is a risk that networks could unravel.24 A vicious circle 
                                                 
19 Given that it is the cardholder who decides on the use of the card, incentives at the merchant side would 
require merchants devising ways of motivating cardholders. This has been a common practice for card stores 
(giving customers free parking space when using the store card or privileges in case of returns). In any case, it 
would be costly, probably ineffective and, more important, out of reach for small merchants. 
20 He assumes that MIFs may be necessary in immature payment card market when saying that in the U.S., a 
very mature market, “bank card issuers sent nearly 5¼ billion direct mail solicitations to U.S. households in 
2004 … [but] average response rate to these solicitation offers has fallen to only 0.4%.… So it would seem hard 
to claim that interchange fees are necessary today to overcome a chicken and egg entry barrier problem.” (Alan 
S. Frankel, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Comment on Weiner and Wright,” Conference on 
“Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What Role for Public Authorities?,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Santa Fe, New Mexico, May 4-6, 2005, p. 9, emphasis added). 
21 This agreement was notified to the TDC and individually exempted by virtue of Decision of April 26, 2000, 
No. A 264/99, Tasas Pago con Tarjeta. 
22 Data from the European Central Bank (2005, op. cit., n. 18). The central bank of Spain observes “in the last 
years a slight slowdown in the growth rate of the number of ATMs and POS terminals, being even possible to 
speak of stagnation for some quarterly observations.” (Bank of Spain, op. cit., 2005, n. 17, p. 63).  
23 Bank of Spain, op. cit., 2005, n. 17, p. 62.  
24 The unbalanced compensation between acquirers and issuers was partly responsible for the slow 
development of the market, as it was felt in Spain during the first years of the payment card market. Before the 
networks had been able to fine tune their prices, the activity of acquiring merchants was rewarded better than 
that of issuing cards and, as a consequence, banks installed too many POS terminals and issued to few cards. 
Some time later, the price structure was changed in the opposite direction, resulting for a short while in the 
opposite imbalance in incentives and behaviors, before the current pricing structure was finally introduced, a 
structure that seems to have been motivating a balanced mix of both acquiring and issuing activities.    9
might develop and the whole system could collapse, with the four-party networks 
fragmenting in three-party networks headed by big banks, four-party networks being scaled-
down and small banks being forced to operate through bilateral agreements.25 These bilateral 
arrangements would entail higher costs for small banks, potentially driving some of them out 
of business, to the detriment of competition. 
Large banks would have an incentive to withdraw from four-party networks and create 
their own three-party networks in which acquirers will only serve the issuing bank’s clients. 
They would also have the means: domestic branch networks, broad customer bases of 
merchants and cardholders, detailed databases and knowledge of merchants and cardholders. 
In pursuing that strategy, they would internalize the positive externalities they produce in 
issuing cards by pricing correctly to merchants and cardholders.  
This would damage medium-sized and small banks, which will be unable to provide a 
similar service, as emphasized by the Visa International decision (para. 59). In particular, 
small banks would strive to reach bilateral agreements, but their negotiation and management 
would be surely very costly, leading to higher discount fees, as predicted by the Visa 
International decision (para. 101).26 Furthermore, the qualification foreseen in this prediction 
of the Visa International decision for those domestic markets with few participants is not 
applicable to Spain,27 because the three networks active in the market have as much as 168 
members.28 Therefore, transactions costs of bilateral contracting would be very high.  
This dismal scenario is likely if the TDC decisions are applied in full. However, even if 
the rules set out by the TDC are toned down, they will cause substantial damage to the 
development of the immature Spanish market.  
A second possibility arising from the decisions would be a substantial unbundling and 
underprovision of services. To the extent that issuers are not allowed to recover the cost of 
specific services through merchants and that direct recovery from users is not realistic, issuers 
will stop providing such services, which will then be unbundled and, given the difficulties 
associated to their provision by third parties, those services will also be underprovided or 
provided at higher cost. This will happen with the payment guarantee and the free funding, if 
the TDC decisions are implemented, given that these costs would be excluded from the 
standard package of services, and should be provided either for a separate price (if this were 
economically and legally viable), or not provided at all. Transaction services will also suffer 
the consequences of the exclusion by the TDC of the possibility of pricing them in variable 
terms. Let us now examine this process for each of these three cost elements.  
                                                 
25 A recent article in the most influential Spanish business weekly asserted that “change in the rules of the game 
[on MIFs] could alter the whole system of electronic payments in Spain and incline banks and savings and loans 
associations to migrate towards alternative payment systems” (“Los tribunales también ‘pasan’ la tarjeta,” 
Actualidad Económica, September 15, 2005, p. 48).  
26 The Commission concludes that “due to negotiation and transaction costs bilateral interchange fees though 
theoretically possible, would result in higher and less transparent fees. This is in its turn likely to lead to higher 
merchant fees” (Commission Decision as COMP.29.373, VISA International, OJ L 318, 22.11.2002, para. 101, 
p. 34).  
27 “This conclusion [on the efficiency gains of a multilateral interchange fee due to lower negotiation and 
transaction costs in the context of the Visa international payment scheme] is not necessarily valid in a domestic 
context, where the number of banks may well be far fewer and the efficiency gains of a multilateral 
arrangement vis-à-vis bilateral agreements may not outweigh the disadvantage of the creation of a restriction of 
competition” (Commission Decision as COMP.29.373, VISA International, OJ L 318, 22.11.2002, n. 45, p. 34). 
28 Euro 6000 has 35 members; 4B, 31; and Servired, 102 (Bank of Spain, op. cit., 2005, n. 17, p. 59, footnote 
5).    10
3 Consequences  of  excluding  most costs in the payment 
guarantee  
3.1  Consequences of the fact that banks do not continue guaranteeing 
payments in domestic transactions given the high cost and value of this 
guarantee in Spain 
If Spanish banks stop guaranteeing payment in domestic card transactions, both 
cardholders and merchants would be damaged because both of them value such guarantee 
against credit risk and would not find effective substitutes.  
The guarantee is valuable in all countries because it is a requirement for the acceptance of 
cards. Indeed, without a payment guarantee, large merchants would extend or develop their 
own systems, but many medium-sized and small merchants would cease to accept cards, as 
recognized by the Visa International decision, which considers the suppression of this cost as 
a factor which is likely to cause “a downward spiral in the size and level of usage of the Visa 
system, and a loss in turnover for all merchants” (para. 88).  
But the payment guarantee is especially valuable in Spain due to the low effectiveness 
and high costs associated to the recovery of debts through judicial procedures and the 
important demand for consumer credit. Indeed, collecting debts in Spain is particularly 
difficult despite recent legal reforms. According to the World Bank, Spain is the OECD 
country with the most complex judicial procedures for debt collection (index 82.6 compared 
to an EU15 average of 55.0), complexity that makes debt collection very costly. For a 
standard case, costs are as high as 10.7% of gross national individual income versus an EU 
average of 5.9% (Table 3).29 It has been estimated that only half of all debts are paid without 
delay and 3.2% are never paid.30 In particular, the effective legal position of bills and checks 
is weak and they are, therefore, hard to collect: as much as 3.6% of commercial bills end up 
unpaid, according to the National Statistical Institute. Understandably, checks are not used 
for over the counter purchases, with only bank-guaranteed checks being used among 
anonymous parties. However, guaranteed checks do not only cost about 1.5-2% of its amount 
to the client, but merchants have to pay an additional 2% to collect them. Discount and 
collection of commercial bills is even costlier, ranging from 0.5 to 5%, with fixed fees, 
minimum fees and add-ons. Invoice collection may cost as much as 12% of face value with a 
minimum of 45€.31  
As it can be deduced from this background, granting of credit entails high transaction 
costs. Nevertheless, the demand for consumer credit is huge: a recent survey indicates that 
96% of Spaniards consider that, when merchants offer to finance consumer purchases, this 
offer gives them “a very important advantage;” and 88% agree that without financing 
                                                 
29 World Bank, Doing Business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth, Oxford University Press, Washington 
DC, 2005.  
30 Clara Fraile, “Cobro de morosos: Entre tres y cuatro de cada cien facturas emitidas se quedan sin pagar,” 
Consumer, May, 2004, reporting on the basis of estimates produced by Intrum Justitia. 
31 According to the official fee schedules of the two main banks, SCH and BBVA, published by the Bank of 
Spain (“Tarifas bancarias,” http://www.bde.es/noticias/dot/tarbp.htm, accessed September 15, 2005).    11
merchants would sell less.32 Considering both the cost and value of credit, it is obvious that 
the payment guarantee gives unique value to Spanish small merchants, who are unable to sell 
on credit by themselves.  
3.2  Lack of substitutes in Spain: credit insurance and factoring are not 
substitutes and would amount to costs higher than the discount rates of 
credit cards 
Products that replicate the payment guarantees provided by the card networks are not 
currently sold in Spain. Not even third party check guarantee services, which might be seen 
as analogous to the card network payment guarantee, are provided. The closest available 
analogy would be commercial credit insurance, which is provided in different forms, like 
factoring33 and pure credit insurance.34 However, it only insures trade credit, not consumer 
credit.  
The characteristics common to both factoring and credit insurance demonstrate important 
lessons, however. Mainly, because both of these financial services are only producible on the 
                                                 
32 Millward Brown Spain, “Estudio sobre uso e imagen de la financiación en los servicios y consumo,” 
prepared for ASNEF, February, Madrid, 2005 (http://www.asnef.com/, accessed September 15, 2005). 
33 It is the so-called factoring without recourse, by which merchants sell their invoices for future payment. 
However, even in the more developed US market it is difficult for businesses to find a factor willing to operate 
with them if their monthly receivables add to less than $10,000. And it is very expensive: factors pay upfront 70 
to 90% of the face value of the debt plus another fraction and this only after the debt is collected. The final total 
discount is usually between 5 to 10% of face value, and varies with the payment period, the industry and the 
credit history of clients. Furthermore, it is unsuitable for firms with small transactions, which make it useless for 
many merchants currently relying on credit cards. See, for instance, Business Owner Toolkit, “Factoring,” 
http://www.toolkit.cch.com/text/P10_3730.asp; Vilma González Morales, “Aspectos generales relacionados con 
el factoraje,” http://www.monografias.com/trabajos12/facto/facto.shtml; José Leyva, “El factoring, un negocio 
de autofinanciamiento,” http://www.injef.com/php/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=361&Itemid=32 
(the three works accessed on September 15, 2005).  
34 Commercial credit insurance enjoys in Spain one of the highest penetration rate worldwide (around 0.060% 
of GDP), accounting for 7% of the world market. (Swiss RE, “El seguro de crédito comercial: La globalización 
y el negocio electrónico presentan grandes oportunidades,” Sigma, 7, September 30, 2000, 
[http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/SHOR-
563HAK/$FILE/sigma7_2000_s_rev.pdf, accessed September 15, 2005]; and J. H., “El seguro de crédito, 
blindaje de las empresas frente a los impagos,” ABC, November, 21, 2004). However, the number of insured 
firms is small, with estimations of around 34,000. Policies sold by Crédito y Caución (CyC), who enjoys a 60% 
market share, are much worst than those bundled with credit cards, in terms of exclusions, complexity and 
coverage: CyC policies exclude sales to individuals, transactions below a minimum figure and sales exceeding 
the credit limit authorized by the insurer for each one of the insured’s clients. Its procedures are complex 
because before making an offer the insurer analyzes the insured’s sector, turnover and credit terms, as well as 
the geographic distribution of its clients. Moreover, to eventually collect an indemnity, insured firms have to 
obtain a credit limit for each of their clients; monthly notify their total turnover; and pay the premiums, which 
are calculated as a variable proportion of sales. Creditors also have to exhaust friendly collection procedures, 
and after these fail, send the insurer a “claims notice” and the original documentation for the unpaid credit. Only 
at that point a loss occurs and an indemnity is paid. But this indemnity is only a percentage of the insured loss 
and, therefore, provides incomplete coverage. (See 
http://www.creditoycaucion.es/ingles/productos/seguro_credito.asp, accessed September 15, 2005). All these 
exclusions and limitations probably remove much of the adverse selection and moral hazard potentially 
plaguing the industry. However, the average premium of credit insurance still reaches averages as high as 0.20 
to 0.25% of sales (Patricia Pérez Zaragoza, “Las empresas se blindan con seguros de crédito,” El Comercio, 
January 9, 2005). It is therefore likely that a policy with the inclusiveness, full coverage and automatism of the 
insurance being now bundled with credit cards would cost many times that amount.   12
basis of previous screening of borrowers, using databases compiled or produced by insurers 
who examine carefully both potential insured clients and borrowers. 
No insurer can reasonably be expected to be able to assess the creditworthiness of each 
individual consumer who might wish to use a card to make a purchase. Consultation with 
more than a few London syndicates has confirmed this point, as none of them has been 
willing (or see themselves in a position able) to underwrite consumer credit in Spain or in any 
other European country.  
If one were to imagine how third party providers might arrange credit insurance for 
consumers, they would undoubtedly need to rely on extensive databases, which would hold 
updated data on consumers’ solvency.35 Building and keeping these databases, however, 
enjoy obvious synergies with conventional banking activities.36 For a third party to construct 
and maintain such a system would be very costly, and the cost would be borne by the 
merchants who would be purchasing the insurance. If, alternatively, these third parties 
providers were to purchase the information from banks, merchants would also end up paying. 
Moreover, this solution would incur additional substantial transaction costs, given the 
“specificity” of such databases, which makes them natural candidates for vertical integration. 
Furthermore, the situation would be bizarre because, under the TDC rules on MIFs, banks 
could recover the costs of such databases when supplying information to third parties but 
would not be allowed to recover such costs in their own credit card transactions.  
In addition, any third party insurance would not provide universal coverage, to both all 
cardholders and to all merchants, as the card networks do today. Not all debtor firms are 
considered creditworthy by commercial credit insurers, and they must be expected to operate 
under similar basis for individuals. Similarly, smaller merchants and merchants engaged in 
riskier types of business might be unable to find coverage at all, as it happens now in 
commercial credit insurance. Furthermore, those who are eligible for coverage would be 
charged a premium (including a minimum premium) and would be subject to a deductible as 
well as a cap. And, of course, the insurer would need to make a profit on this insurance. 
There is no question that the ultimate cost would be higher for the vast majority of merchants 
than it is today, and the scope of coverage would be inferior. 
3.3  The cost and nature of the payment guarantee 
These databases and other default-prevention resources have crucial and often negative 
consequences in terms of costs’ structure.  
Indeed, credit card lending is one of the most risky activities for banks. For example, the 
Bank of Spain computes credit card loans within the riskiest categories of bank assets, 
together with consumer financing and overdrafts.37 The Bank of Spain estimates that the 
doubtful assets ratio was 1.5% for 1999 and 4% for 2003 of the total card credit 
                                                 
35 See in this regard, Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert and Janusz A. Ordover, “Merchant Benefits and Public Policy 
towards Interchange: An Economic Assessment,” Conference on “Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment 
Systems: Causes and Consequences,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, September 15-16, 2005 
(www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2005/antitrust/Guerin_Calvert_Ordover.pdf, accessed September 
15, 2005).  
36 See George J. Benston and Clifford W. Smith, “A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial 
Intermediation,” Journal of Finance, 31(2), May, 1976, pp. 215-231. 
37 Bank of Spain, Informe de Estabilidad Financiera, Madrid, May 2003, p. 23 
(http://www.bde.es/informes/be/estfin/estfin.htm, accessed September 15, 2005).    13
outstanding.38 On the basis of the previous economic cycle, most banks were recording 1.5% 
of their total credit card loans in 2002 (last year for which this data is available) as an 
allowance for doubtful accounts.39 The costs of effective defaults are therefore very 
substantial. However, effective defaults are not the full cost of the payment guarantee, which 
also includes the cost of avoiding defaults, that is, the issuing banks (or the networks in three 
party systems) spend more resources in preventing and avoiding the potential existence of 
defaults than in covering real defaults. These preventive default-avoidance measures include 
all those investments and activities necessary (1) to determine the economics of potential 
target groups; (2) to evaluate credit risk of individuals before issuing them cards (around 50% 
rejection rate is common in quality cards); and, once the cards are issued, (3) to authorize 
specific transactions in a way that minimizes the chances of default (this requires keeping 
track of individual expenditure and payment records, and developing and operating credit 
scoring systems).40  
In conclusion, lenders could not survive by merely insuring merchants on an actuarial 
basis—paying bad debts from what they earn from their good debts—, but they must prevent 
bad debts altogether. An actuarial approach to lending would die from adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection because, without previous screening, those borrowers more 
prone to default would be the ones borrowing the most. Moral hazard because borrowers, 
lacking proper incentives to pay, would default more.  
The TDC makes two fundamental mistakes when arguing that the payment guarantee 
does not cost anything to the banks, given that banks always end up collecting their bad 
debts:41 first, the TDC overlooks that banks do not always recover payments, as the figures 
published by the Bank of Spain clearly show; second, the TDC ignores the huge costs of 
preventing default, which are vital for the existence of credit.  
                                                 
38 These estimations are based on insolvency rates for specialized credit outlets, as no separate data is publicly 
available for banks. See Bank of Spain, Informe de Estabilidad Financiera, Madrid, May 2005, p. 42, Graph 
I.5(c) (http://www.bde.es/informes/be/estfin/estfin.htm, accessed September 15, 2005). A good part of its 
variability may have been caused by new entrants accepting higher rates of default in its first years of business. 
Estimations are also based downwards, however, because given the legal difficulties to proceed against credit 
cards users, many banks treat these non-payments as overdrafts on the associated current accounts, and the final 
defaults therefore end up misclassified. Even higher default rates are common in less developed markets. For 
instance, a recent report estimated defaults in 6.5% of outstanding credit in Peru, according to Superintendencia 
de Banca, Seguros y AFP, Noticias Diarias, May 5, 2005 
(http://www.sbs.gob.pe/PortalSBS/noticias/historico/2005/Mayo/05.05.2005.htm, accessed September 15, 
2005).  
39 In application of the Bank of Spain’s Regulation 9/1999. See Bank of Spain, Informe de Estabilidad 
Financiera, Madrid, November 2002, pp. 26-27 (http://www.bde.es/informes/be/estfin/estfin.htm, accessed 
September 15, 2005). Rule 4/2004 (http://www.bde.es/normativa/circu/c200404.pdf), enacted in January 2005 
in order to adapt the Spanish standards to those of the International Accounting Standards Board, maintains the 
same consideration of credit card lending as one of the most risky and the same allowance.  
40 The problem is more general, affecting all industries which are dedicated to prevent risks and, as a 
consequence, have a hard time convincing clients and regulators about the reasonableness of their prices. What 
happens is that clients and regulators do easily perceive and recognize the costs of paying the losses that these 
firms suffer (defaults in the case of credit insurance). However, both clients and regulators are prone to miss, 
and are therefore reluctant to recognize, the less explicit but often greater costs incurred in preventing losses. 
See on this, Benito Arruñada, “A Transaction Cost View of Title Insurance and its Role in Different Legal 
Systems,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 27(4), October, 2002, pp. 582-601. 
41 TDC Decision of April 11, 2005, No. A 314/02, Tasas Intercambio SISTEMA 4B, p. 35.    14
3.4  Conclusion: The criteria in the Visa International decision are fully 
applicable to domestic transactions but they were not applied by the 
TDC, who only allows payment systems to include fraud in their MIFs 
The two arguments used by the Visa International decision for including the payment 
guarantee are fully applicable in light of the circumstances of Spanish domestic transactions. 
The Commission considered that merchants benefit from this “insurance” and, in its absence, 
they would have to self-insure. Moreover, it found no evidence of third party provision of this 
service, (which would in any case be inefficient) (see paras. 86 to 88). All these elements are 
present in Spanish domestic transactions.  
The Visa International decision also argued that the payment guarantee is more costly for 
cross-border transactions because of more difficult recovery. However, recovery in domestic 
transactions is a matter of the particular performance of institutions in each country. In the 
case of Spain, recovery is particularly costly and inefficient. Therefore, the reasoning of the 
Commission in relation to this cost in the Visa International decision is fully applicable to 
Spanish domestic interchange fees.  
4 Consequences  of  excluding  the cost of the free funding 
period 
4.1  Consequences of banks ceasing to provide a free funding period 
If banks have to stop providing the free funding period to cardholders, cardholders will 
have to dedicate more recourses to manage their cash, to avoid the cost of overdrafts, as high 
as 4.5% with a minimum between 3 and 15€.42 To the extent that buyers cannot easily check 
the balance in their current accounts, they will spend more in searching costs and will often 
postpone and concentrate their purchases.  
Free funding not only allows buyers to anticipate their demand, it also smoothes 
consumption. This smoothing greatly benefits merchants by reducing their optimal capacity 
and therefore their cost of capital: As clients purchase more regularly, stores are smaller and 
fixed resources are better utilized.  
This makes clear that the value of free funding and the losses from its disappearance are 
different for large and small merchants. Large merchants will benefit from the greater 
demand enjoyed by their integrated payment systems, based on store cards, which will 
continue offering free funding as they have always done, but now as sole providers of such 
service. Small merchants, however, will suffer, because they will find impossible to provide a 
similar service. 
4.2  Greater benefits of free funding in Spain 
Free funding is especially valuable for those people who are less methodical in their cash 
management. It is therefore especially valuable in Spain, because of the prevalence of last 
minute improvisation, of which there is ample evidence for both consumers and merchants. 
                                                 
42 Same source as that in n. 31.    15
Surveys repeatedly point out that most Spaniards have financial difficulties to make ends 
meet and “reach the end of the month,”43 the moment when salaries are typically paid and 
even city traffic becomes much less fluid. Similarly, Spanish firms are quite lenient in their 
cash management, as pointed out by the preparatory works of the Directive on late payments 
(see Table 4).44 Spanish merchants are therefore likely to benefit greatly from the cash 
management and reliable payment services provided through the card payment networks.  
4.3  Conclusion: the arguments used by the Visa International decision to 
include the cost of the free funding period do hold for Spanish domestic 
transactions  
The TDC view is that the Visa International decision includes the cost of the free funding 
period due to its special value in cross-border transactions, and that this special value does 
not apply to domestic transactions. This interpretation is mistaken, because cardholders suffer 
similar difficulties for checking their bank balances in domestic as well as in cross-border 
transactions.  
The Commission ponders that international travelers have difficulties to know the balance 
in their bank account when they are traveling. However, most cardholders suffer the same 
problem when they are in a store and do not know their balance. This is especially true for 
travelers in domestic markets, who, not knowing a city well enough, face serious difficulties 
to find an ATM machine or a bank office where they can check their account. Their cash 
management is made much easier by having a line of credit in their cards, which acts as 
cushion and can be controlled once a month. Otherwise, significant purchases would be 
postponed until the balance is checked and, as a result, many intended purchases would not 
be made.  
5  Consequences of excluding many processing costs 
and establishing a flat fee 
The TDC decisions exclude many processing costs and deny that other processing costs 
vary with the value and type of the transaction. Consequently, the resulting MIFs would not 
allow to recover some processing costs and would misallocate other costs among transactions 
and industries.  
                                                 
43 In the first quarter of 2005, 54.74% of Spanish families found it difficult to make ends meet according to a 
survey of the National Statistical Institute that they INE, “Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares,” Quarterly 
survey, Madrid, 2005). 
44 For instance, the data collected by Intrum Justitia showed that the average payment period of Spanish firms 
was 68 days, compared to an EU average of 39 days, only behind the 75 days of Greek firms. See, for data, 
European Payment Habits Survey, Intrum Justitia, Amsterdam, April 8, 1997; and, for an analysis, Benito 
Arruñada, La Directiva sobre morosidad, Marcial Pons–Instituto de Estudios de Libre Comercio, Madrid, 1999. 
The situation is getting worse: in a 2003 update of the said data, the payment period was 67 days but average 
delay increased to 13.4 days.    16
5.1  Consequences of excluding processing costs 
The TDC excludes the costs of administering cards, such as those of keeping files for 
managing risk and keeping the card’s account, as well as those of solving disputes, with the 
argument that they do not “fundamentally” benefit merchants.  
This benefit-to-merchants criterion is misleading and the analysis ends up being flawed 
unless proper consideration is given to indirect benefits, that is, externalities, which have 
been recognized by the Visa International decision.45 Otherwise, when benefits are narrowly 
seen as direct, immediate and observable benefits, as done by the TDC, less visible benefits 
remain unrewarded and will, therefore, be underprovided.46  
The consequences of this underpricing may be minor for cross-border transactions 
(because most investments are decided on the basis of national markets), but they are crucial 
for national MIFs. If issuers are forced to recover their investments only from cardholders, 
and cardholders are not rewarded for the externalities they produce, underinvestment is 
inevitable and will only be made worse by the usual lag in observability until investments 
need to be renewed.  
5.2  Consequences of forbidding variable and sectorial pricing 
The TDC accepts including in the calculation of MIFs the costs of authorizing, clearing 
and settling transactions, because they “benefit merchants”47 by allowing them to transact 
with unknown clients belonging to banks other than their acquiring bank. The TDC argues, 
however, that these costs are the same for all transactions, whatever their value, and in all 
sectors. Consequently, the TDC only allows to include in the MIF a fixed processing cost, 
constant with value and across merchant industries.  
The basis for this rationale is factually wrong, as the processing costs of authorizing, 
clearing and settling are not the same across different transactions and industries. Service and 
quality control cannot be the same for small and large amount transactions, as clearly shown 
by the common practice of processing small transactions in batches and even without 
authorization. In addition, most interchange fees in the Spanish financial markets have a 
mixed structure, with fixed and variable components.48 These interchange rates provide a 
suitable comparison, because they respond to a similar technology (network economies, 
multiparty markets, types of risk) and institutions (law, judiciary, regulators, education).  
The rationale for sectorial differences is also discernible in the distribution of fees across 
industries. As shown in Table 5 below, higher fees are charged in sectors in which the card 
network provides more services, mainly suffering higher default and fraud rates, which are 
partly driven by the lower transaction costs of second hand transactions. For example, MIFs 
for car rental are higher than in other sectors, because they include a greater element of risk: 
                                                 
45 “The Commission does accept that a four-party payment scheme is characterized by externalities, and that 
there is interdependent demand from merchants and cardholders” (para. 65). 
46 The evaluation of benefits should in any case be deduced from behavior. Considering the high price of 
alternative services, it is hard to believe that merchants accept cards purely because of strategic reasons, and not 
on the basis of the value they get from the services being provided. 
47 Not without considering, however, that part of these costs might be paid by cardholders.  
48 See Instituto Superior de Técnicas y Prácticas Bancarias, Práctica, normalización y regulación del sistema y 
los medios de pago, Madrid, 2005.    17
in addition to the rental price, the user is committed to future payments, such as those caused 
by collision or damage when total or partially uninsured, traffic tickets, late delivery and gas 
and service charges. These events may lead to disputes between the cardholder and the issuer, 
where the latter needs to cover the costs of the subsequent investigations made also for the 
benefit of merchants. In general, top rates are applied in sectors with higher default and fraud 
rates, the latter because the transaction costs of selling second hand goods are either low 
(jewelry) or zero (casinos), as well as for personal services (saunas, hotels) for which not 
even a second transaction is needed to obtain a benefit from fraudulently using a card.  
Consequently, the application of the TDC rules would cause serious redistribution and 
misallocation of resources, with high-cost transactions and industries subsidizing those with 
low costs.49 Moreover, to the extent that wealthier cardholders are those making bigger and 
costlier transactions, the TDC scheme of fixed pricing—irrespective of transaction size and 
therefore transaction cost—would redistribute wealth from poor to wealthy cardholders. 
Similarly, department stores and hypermarkets would profit doubly from their greater 
possibilities of aggregating small transactions, to the detriment of specialized merchants. 
Large retailers appear, again, as the only winners in this regulatory venture, whereas 
consumers, unfortunately, are likely to be the main losers. 
6 Conclusion 
In summary, this paper concludes that the TDC decisions interpret too narrowly the Visa 
International decision and exclude from the MIF certain costs which provide important 
benefits to the participants in the Spanish card market. Artificially lowering the MIFs will not 
necessarily lower consumer prices and will lead to higher cardholders’ fees. By prohibiting 
the inclusion of the cost of certain significant and valuable services in the MIF, the TDC 
decisions have removed essential benefits to merchants and consumers, and eliminated 
incentives in a market (Spain) that needs development and growth. This may result in 
potential imbalances between participants, threatening to cause detrimental impact to the 
networks.  
Moreover, making it uneconomic for the networks to provide fundamental services 
(guarantee of payment beyond fraud cost and free funding period) will lead to the unbundling 
of those services under the MIF, thereby causing the participants to obtain them separately (if 
at all) at substantial hardship and increased costs. It is questionable in the Spanish market 
whether certain services like the payment guarantee for credit risk and interest free funding 
can be replaced; and, even if the interest free funding could be replaced, it would be at a far 
greater cost. In addition, fixing processing costs at an unrealistically low level further creates 
serious financial strain on the system, and will lead to an inefficient and ineffective allocation 
of such interchange costs among transactions and industries.  
The emerging Spanish card market needs a broader base of participants to stimulate its 
development if it is to become robust and vibrant. Instead, the consequences of the TDC 
decisions will negatively impact and stifle the growth of this market. 
                                                 
49 A reduction in the range of MIFs across sectors has already been observed in Spain after the 1999 agreement 
mentioned in n. 21. Maximum discount rates fell from 3.48% to 2.98% but minimum rates increased from 
0.54% to 0.70%, between 2002 and 2004 (Bank of Spain, op. cit., 2005, n. 17, p. 59).    18
Appendix 
 
Table 1. Market shares of store/label cards in the European Union (1998-1999) 
 
Number of cards in 
circulation-POS 
capability 
Total number  
of card transactions  
at POS 
Total value  
of card transactions  
at POS 
France  45.95% 10.95% 12.20% 
Sweden  32.87% 19.69% 13.04% 
Spain 19.54%  8.55%  10.03% 
Finland 18.66%  9.44%  11.28% 
Denmark 18.25%  0.24%  1.44% 
United Kingdom  14.85%  1.75%  1.29% 
EU average  12.72%  4.77%  5.73% 
Belgium  10.79% 14.60% 26.75% 
Italy  9.01% 0.72% 0.95% 
Austria  6.32% 0.51% 2.26% 
Portugal  4.73% 0.60% 1.03% 
Netherlands  3.45% 0.33% 1.17% 
Germany  3.41% 4.13% 4.48% 
Greece  2.15% 0.06% 0.08% 
Ireland  0.81% 0.00% 0.00% 
Luxembourg  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Note: These data substantially underestimate the true number because it uses 1998 data store cards and 1999 
data for the rest. Source: Commission Decision as COMP.29.373, VISA International, OJ L 293, 11.10.2001, 
pp. 39-41.   19
Table 2. Comparison of the Spanish and European payment systems in 2003 
 Spain  EU  Spain/EU 
Banknotes and coins in circulation outside credit institutions (end of 
2001):     
Value per inhabitant (€)  1,060  815  130.06% 
As a percentage of GDP  6.5  3.5  185.71% 
Cards with a cash function and ATMs:       
Number of ATMs per 1,000,000 inhabitants (end of year)  1,274  732  174.04% 
Number of transactions per inhabitant  22.0  28.0  78.57% 
Average value per transaction (€)  97.0  122.0  79.51% 
Estimated total value of transactions per inhabitant (€)  2,134  3,416  62.47% 
Estimated number of transactions per ATM  17,268  38,251  45.14% 
Estimated total value of transactions per ATM (€)  1,675,039  4,666,667  35.89% 
Cards with a debit function and POS terminals:       
Number of POS terminals per 1,000,000 inhabitants (end of year)  23,514  13,678  171.91% 
Number of transactions per inhabitant  15.5  38.8  39.95% 
Average value per transaction (€)  43.6  60.2  72.43% 
Estimated total value of transactions per inhabitant (€)  676  2,336  28.93% 
Estimated number of transactions per POS terminal  659  2,837  23.24% 
Estimated total value of transactions per POS terminal (€)  28,740  170,768  16.83% 
Cards with a credit function and accepting terminals:       
Number of accepting terminals per 1,000,000 inhabitants (end of 
year)  23,514 13,998 167.98% 
Increase in the number of accepting terminals (% increase between 
1999 and 2003)  32.85%  49.65%  66.17% 
Number of transactions per inhabitant  11.4  13.4  85.07% 
Average value per transaction (€)  61.2  83.0  73.73% 
Estimated total value of transactions per inhabitant (€)  697.7  1,112.2  62.73% 
Estimated number of transactions per POS terminal  485  957  50.65% 
Estimated total value of transactions per POS terminal (€)  29,671  79,454  37.34% 
Utilization of cards, average number of:       
Cash withdrawals per card with a cash function  15.3  23.2  65.95% 
Payments per card with a debit function  11.1  44.6  24.89% 
Payments per card with a credit function  19.5  21.1  92.42% 
Utilization of cards, average value of total annual transactions per card:       
Cash withdrawals per card with a cash function  1,484  2,830  52.43% 
Payments per card with a debit function  484  2,685  18.03% 
Payments per card with a credit function  1,193  1,751  68.14% 
Source of data: European Central Bank, Payment and Securities Settlement Systems in the European Union 
(Addendum Incorporating 2003 Figures), Frankfurt, August 2005 (http://www.bde.es/sispago/bbestade.pdf, 
accessed September 15, 2005).   20














Spain 20  147  10.7  82.6 
France 21  210  3.8  79.2 
Poland 18  1,000  11.2  65.3 
Slovenia 22  1,003  3.6  65.3 
Czech Republic  16  270  18.5  64.6 
Italy 16  645  3.9  64.3 
Greece 15  315  8.2  63.9 
Mexico 47  325  10  61.8 
Germany 22  154  6  61.1 
Lithuania  17 74 13 58.3 
World average  25.0  307.0  38.3  57.7 
Hungary 17  365  5.4  56.9 
EU (25) average  18.8  326.0  7.4  56.0 
Latvia 19  189  7.5  55.6 
EU (15) average  18.5  251.9  5.9  55.0 
Portugal 22  420  4.9  54.2 
Austria 20  434  1  53.9 
Belgium 22  365  9.1  53.5 
OCDE average  18.9  272.0  7.9  50.5 
Korea, Rep.  23  75  4.5  50 
Finland 19  240  15.8  47.9 
Norway 12  87  10.4  47.9 
Netherlands 21  39  0.5  45.8 
United States  17  365  0.4  45.8 
Sweden 19  190  7.6  44.4 
Switzerland 14  224  3.9  44.4 
Ireland 16  183  7.2  42.4 
Slovak Republic  26  420  13.3  40.3 
Denmark 14  83  3.8  40.3 
Japan 16  60  6.4  39.2 
Turkey 18  105  5.4  38.2 
United Kingdom  12  101  0.5  36.2 
New Zealand  19  50  11.6  31.3 
Canada 17  425  28  29.2 
Australia 11  320  8  29.2 
Note: EU 15 excludes Luxemburg, EU 25 excludes Estonia Cyprus and Malta, and OECD excludes Luxemburg 
and Iceland.   Source: World Bank, Doing Business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth, Oxford 
University Press, Washington DC, 2005.   21
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Greece  75 65 19 34 94 99 
Spain  68 68 6  4  74 72 
Italy  65 47 22 10 87 57 
Portugal  50 67 41 2  91 69 
France  48 45 10 6  58 51 
Belgium  41 44 20 17 61 61 
Ireland  35 35 16 14 51 49 
UK  31 38 18 10 49 48 
Austria  29 33 8  6  37 39 
Switzerland  28 42 10 13 38 55 
Denmark  27 31 7  10 34 41 
Netherlands  27 35 19 13 46 48 
Sweden  25 32 7  9  32 41 
Germany  23 30 11 12 34 42 
Norway  21 32 6  4  27 36 
Finland  19 29 10 21 29 50 
Average  39 42 15 12 54 54 
Source: Intrum Justitia, European Payment Habits Survey, Amsterdam, April 8, 1997.   22
Table 5. MIFs in different sectors of the Spanish economy in the fourth quarter of 2004 
Sector Fee  (%) 
Massages 2.98 











Car rental  1.67 
Travel agencies  1.61 
Pharmacists 1.49 
Department stores, rest  1.33 
Supermarkets 1.23 
Gas stations  0.71 
Department stores, food  0.70 
Source: Bank of Spain, “Evolución en España de las tarjetas como medio de 
pago (1996-2004),” Estabilidad financiera, no. 8, May, 2005, p. 61. 
 